































Working Paper Series  Brasília  n. 195  Oct.  2009  p. 1-47  





Edited by Research Department (Depep) – E-mail: workingpaper@bcb.gov.br 
 
Editor: Benjamin Miranda Tabak – E-mail: benjamin.tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Editorial Assistent: Jane Sofia Moita – E-mail: jane.sofia@bcb.gov.br 
Head of Research Department: Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo – E-mail: carlos.araujo@bcb.gov.br  
 
The Banco Central do Brasil Working Papers are all evaluated in double blind referee process. 
  
Reproduction is permitted only if source is stated as follows: Working Paper n. 195. 
 




General Control of Publications 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Cogiv 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 1º andar 
Caixa Postal 8.670 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Phones: +55 (61) 3414-3710 and 3414-3565 





The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central or  
its members. 
 
Although these Working Papers often represent preliminary work, citation of source is required when used or reproduced. 
 
 
As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são exclusivamente do(s) autor(es) e não refletem, necessariamente, a visão do Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
 





Consumer Complaints and Public Enquiries Center 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Diate 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 2º subsolo 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Fax: +55 (61) 3414-2553 
Internet: http//www.bcb.gov.br/?english 3 
 
From Default Rates to Default Matrices: 











The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views of the Banco 
Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central do Brasil. 
 
 
Despite the manifold utilities of monitoring credit default rates, little attention is 
usually devoted to the underlying default definition. This paper proposes working 
simultaneously with different default severities, related to several past-due ranges, 
by means of transition matrices (to be named default matrices). In this way, 
default, as well as recovery, is depicted in a multidimensional way with the 
purpose of avoiding missing relevant information. The challenge lies on 
performing comparisons between default matrices, which requires specific metrics. 
In this paper, the default matrices are built to measure consumer credit delinquency 
at four large Brazilian banks. The study is able to draw relevant information from 
comparisons between estimations techniques, between default criteria, between 
banks and over time, as well as with recent applied literature on matrices of rating 
agencies. 
JEL classification: C13; C41; G21; G32 
Keywords: default rates; credit delinquency; transition matrices; banks. 
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Default rate is a term frequently used in financial and economic circles to designate the 
percentage of borrowers of a given universe (e.g. a specific bank portfolio) that have not 
or will not comply to their credit obligations. Measuring and monitoring historic loan 
default rates is important for several reasons. Based on past default data, expectations of 
future delinquency is one of the components that usually explains the level of bank 
spreads (see BCB, 1999). Also, the monitoring of default rate time series makes it 
possible to draw relationships with business cycles (e.g., Bangia et al, 2002) and may 
assist in constructing anti-cyclical regulations dealing with bank provision or capital 
(e.g., Jiménez and Saurina, 2006). Further, measuring default rates is a problem closely 
related to that of estimating PDs (probabilities of default) in credit rating models, which 
is required by Basel II (e.g. BCBS, 2004). Finally, monitoring default rates is generally 
part of the financial stability task of supervisory authorities and Central Banks. In Brazil 
in particular, the last years of economic expansion (up to the financial turmoil) have 
observed a sharp increase in credit volumes and in the number of borrowers, with little 
research devoted to the consequences of that to the behavior of default rates. 
Generally, default rates can be measured either following a stock approach or a flow 
approach. In the stock approach, both the numerator and the denominator of the default 
rate refer to quantities of borrowers at the same point in time (e.g. a selected month). An 
example of such measurement could be the percentage of outstanding borrowers that is 
90 days past-due in a specific month. However, default stock rates are affected by non-
default events such as variations on the number of borrowers being granted loans or on 
the maturity of new loans. For example, an increase in the number of borrowers in the 
early stages of a credit boom could reduce default stock rates simply due to an increase 
in the denominator base, a phenomenon not related necessarily to any improvement in 
individual credit risk. Therefore, though computationally more demanding, this study 
favors the measurement of default rates using a flow approach. 
In the flow approach, the numerator and the denominator of the default rate refer to 
different points in time but to the same group of borrowers. An example could be the 
percentage of borrowers that become 90-days past-due during the course of a specific 
year. This is an example of a univariate flow that considers only one criterion of default 5 
 
(90 days). If, instead, several default severities are simultaneously considered to avoid 
missing relevant information (e.g. several past-due ranges), one arrives at a multivariate 
flow description of default. That is precisely the notion of transition matrices where the 
underlying states being transited are the different default severities (besides the non-
default states). This paper proposes such matrices (to be named default matrices) as a 
more complete measurement of default, as well as of recovery, than solely default rates, 
and investigates their use. Results based on default matrices reveal indeed that 
measurement of credit delinquency may vary considerably depending on the 
measurement tool used. 
The applied literature on credit risk transition matrices basically concentrates on 
matrices of rating agencies (where the states are the external credit ratings). Initial 
works have been Bangia et al. (2002) and Nickell et al. (2000), both discussing the 
sensitivities on these matrices to phases of the business cycle. Point estimation and 
confidence interval estimation of rating matrices have been discussed by Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002), Christensen et al. (2004), Hanson and Schuermann (2004) and 
Gagliardini and Gouriéroux (2005). Comparisons between transitions matrices (e.g. 
over time) is much more complicated than the trivial comparison between default rates 
and requires specific metrics. Gewecke et al.(1986) and Jafry and Schuermann (2004) 
discuss such metrics. On the other hand, the applied literature is scarce on matrices 
whose underlying states are not external agencies’ ratings. Mahlmann (2006) represents 
an exception that deals with matrices derived from banks’ internal ratings but, to best of 
the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to work with matrices built based on 
different default severities, the so-called default matrices. 
 
This study employs the proposed default matrices to measure default risk in consumer 
credit at large Brazilian banks
1. Consumer credit is well suited to the purposes of this 
study since it is a typical form of retail credit, where the number of borrowers is large 
and the management practices are more uniform across banks. As with other types of 
credit, consumer credit has experienced a large increase over the last years. Figure 1 
shows that the number of loans at four large Brazilian banks has almost tripled over a 
period of five years.  
                                                 
1 At this paper, consumer credit refers to non-revolving, non-payroll guaranteed credit and excludes auto, house and other types of 




Figure 1: Time series of the number of consumer credit loans 






















































In measuring the default risk of Brazilian consumer credit through the use of default 
matrices, this paper has both methodological and practical (or policy-oriented) goals. 
Included in the former, there are the questions of how default matrices compare to 
rating agencies’ matrices and how the different methods of estimation compare to each 
other specifically in the case of default matrices. From a practical point of view, this 
study aims at extracting relevant information from comparisons between the different 
default criteria underlying the default matrices, from the time evolution of default in 
Brazilian consumer credit over the last years and from how it behaved differently 
between banks along this period. 
 
Section 2 presents the data used in the estimation. Section 3 discusses several 
approaches to estimating default matrices and comparing them. Section 4 contains a 




The database used in this study is based on data drawn from the Brazilian Public Credit 
Register. It consists of time series of regulatory credit risk classifications of consumer 
loans at four large Brazilian banks from January 2003 until January 2008
2. The database 
includes loans started before January 2003, but still in effect during the time span of the 
study, or started within that period.
3 Almost all of the loans do not stay in the database 
until January 2008, for a series of reasons presented below. For estimation purposes, the 
database is consolidated by borrower within each bank, taking the worst loan 




In order to increase comparability between classifications and, therefore, between 
default matrices of different banks, this study is restricted to borrowers with small loans 
(e.g. smaller than R$50,000 in the initial month), that, according to Brazilian regulation, 
can be subject to review solely as a result of arrears. Besides, those reviews must 
happen on a monthly basis, so that the problem raised by Mahlmann (2006), relative to 
the non-observation of the precise months in which classification transitions indeed 
occur, is not relevant to the present study. Finally, I carry out reclassifications of the 
original regulatory classifications in order to increase the interpretation of the former as 
occurrences of brackets of arrears, according to table 1. At the end of the process, the 
resulting classifications are expected to portray information on arrears according to 
table 1 plus, although to a lesser extent, any additional bank private information on loan 
delinquency.  
                                                 
2 Regulatory classifications are regulated by Resolution 2682/99 of the Central Bank of Brazil. Only consumer loans without 
payroll-deduction and without earmarked funds are considered. The four large banks refer to four large financial conglomerates with 
their constitutions restricted to their most representative financial institutions in consumer credit (typically two institutions per 
conglomerate). 
3 The creation of a database on a time-series format, suitable to this study, is a very lengthy and demanding computational task.  
4 That multiplicity is, however, very rare (≈2%). 8 
 
 
Table 1 – Interpretation of classifications as arrears
5 
Classification  A  AR B  C  D  E  F  G  H 
Arrears 
(days) 
















In the database, the continuous observation of consumer loans and of their borrowers 
can be censored prior to January 2008 for a variety of reasons: 1) loan paid and not 
renovated, 2) loan sold or transferred without guarantee to outside the bank, 3) loan that 
was written-off removed from balance-sheet, 4) outstanding loan balance falls below 
threshold required for the loan to be reported on an individual basis,
6 5) consumer loan 
is replaced by another form of credit (e.g. overdraft). 
 
As it is practically impossible to infer what was the case that really happened, this study 
regards the right censorship as non-informative for modeling purposes. In doing so, the 
empirical results of this paper should be understood as conditional on the manifestation 
of default risk while derived from within the banks analyzed and restricted to the form 
of consumer credit
7. Accordingly, in order to avoid unrealistic representations of the 
default risk experienced by the banks, I adopt the time horizon of one semester for the 
default matrices, notably less than the typical 1-year horizon of rating agencies’ 
matrices. The one-year horizon was found to be longer than the typical consumer 
borrower lifetime in some of the banks, and particularly greater than the remaining 
lifetime of borrowers with loans already past due at the starting point of the horizon. 
 
Default matrices are estimated on section 4 for each bank, so that it is interesting to 
have an idea of the database size on a bank level. For the sake of brevity, size numbers 
are reported only for bank 1. During the time span of the study, it encompasses 343,616 
borrowers, a number significantly higher than the corresponding number underlying 
matrices of rating agencies, of around 10,000. Borrower-month observations are at the 
figure of 3,228,401. Transitions to a different classification, including the appearance 
                                                 
5 It’s imperative to recall that those classifications are distinct from those present in Resolution 2682/99. AR refers to consumer 
loans in no arrears but that have been the result of renegotiation of past loans, possibly in arrears. 
6 Only loans above R$ 5,000 are reported on an individual basis in the Brazilian Credit Register, so that the database in this study is 
restricted to them. 
7 Therefore, difference of delinquency behavior between banks, besides being the result of distinct credit market niches, could also 
be related to distinct credit management policies adopted by the banks (e.g. risk transfer policy). 9 
 
and disappearance of borrowers, amount to 1,129,385 transitions, while excluding them, 
add up to 273,248. The last observation points out to the sparcity of the database and 





3.1 Estimating matrices 
 
This section discusses the estimation of banks’ consumer credit default matrices.  To 
accomplish that, the time series of classifications of each bank is seen as a realization of 
a Markov chain of nine states (“A” through “H”, according to table 1) in discrete or 
continuous time, depending on the estimation technique employed. 
The simplest and most used estimation technique is the cohort method, based on 
discrete time. The technique is widely employed by rating agencies and the academic 
literature (e.g. Cantor and Hamilton, 2007).  Given Ni  borrowers with a given 
classification i at the start of the time horizon considered, suppose that Nij of these end 






p = ˆ    (1) 
If the transition process is also assumed time-homogeneous, one can use the 
multinomial estimator, in which Ni and Nij are collected over the course of various 







p ˆ  (2) 
Estimators of discrete type permit the construction of analytical confidence intervals for 
the elements of the default matrices.  Due to the significant number of borrowers upon 
which this study is based, it is safe to adopt the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution (below) for the construction of such intervals. Also the independence 10 
 
assumption underlying the binomial distribution is easier to be imposed at the short 
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On the other hand, the continuous time estimation based on survival analysis (also 
called duration) makes use of the transitions observed at shorter frequencies than 
horizon T, assuming a Markov process homogeneous or not.  In the homogeneous case, 
estimation by survival analysis turns into estimation of the generator matrix G of the 
chain, which allows the production of transition matrices for any forecasting horizon 
t=αT, α>0, according to the equation below. 
P(t)=exp(Gα), (4) 
 in which P(t)≡(Pij(t)) is the transition probability matrix for horizon t.  












where M is the number of months in horizon T, Nij is the total number of transitions 
from i to j observed in the base and Yi(t) is the number of borrowers of classification i 
in month t. 
Finally, the non-homogeneous continuous time case is equivalent to applying the cohort 
method for the shortest observation frequency, monthly in the case at hand, in order to 
estimate monthly transition matrices. Then, a horizon-T matrix is formed by 
appropriately multiplying T previously estimated monthly matrices.  This is, in fact, an 
application of the Aalen-Johansen estimator and the resulting matrix so obtained is 
specific to the time period used in the estimation. 
                                                 
8 Here N can mean Ni or ΣNi, depending on the point estimator used. 11 
 
By using all the information available in the database, the continuous time estimations 
have three major advantages in relation to the discrete methods, as discussed by Lando 
and Skodeberg (2002). First, non-null probabilities are generated for transitions that 
have not occurred for any fixed set of borrowers, but that are plausible through 
intermediate transitions that have occurred for different sets of borrowers. Second, 
transitions of borrowers that do not remain in the base during all the months of horizon 
T, either due to withdrawal prior to the final month or entry subsequent to the initial 
month, are used in the method, producing more efficient estimations.  Third, transition 
matrices are generated for arbitrary time horizons with greater ease, particularly in the 
homogeneous case. 
Yet, Gagliardini and Gouriéroux (2005) propose a procedure that is somewhat different 
from the estimators described above.  In a context in which the horizon-T matrices are 
assumed themselves stochastic, albeit i.i.d., the authors demonstrate that it is the 
average of the various sample matrices of different consecutive periods of duration T 
that produces the appropriate estimator
9. In particular, when each of those is estimated 
by cohort, the simple average, instead of the weighted average given by the multinomial 
estimator, is the appropriate estimator. That observation may be particular importance to 




3.2 Comparing matrices 
 
In order to compare how different are delinquencies and their dynamics among various 
banks, metrics for transition matrices must be considered. Jafry and Schuermann (2004) 
examine alternative proposals of metrics, with the goal of measuring the average 
quantity of “mobility” embedded into the matrices. Mobility is understood as the 
probability of migration to a classification different from the original one and the 
aurthors suggest a metric (denoted hereafter as Mob) based on the singular value 
decomposition of the matrix to be measured.  
 
                                                 
9 Gagliardini and Gouriéroux (2005) make use of those assumptions to discuss estimation of migration correlation, so that their 
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where D is the dimension of P, λis are the autovalues of the matrix in parentheses, P is 
the transition matrix to be measured and I is the identity matrix. 
 
The authors’ preference towards Mob is based on the properties of mononicity (M(P1) > 
M(P2) if p1ij ≥ p2ij ∀i≠j and p1ij > p2ij for some i≠j) and distribution discrimination (M(P1) 




ΔMob ≡ |Mob(P1)- Mob(P2)|    (7) 
 
However, even for the proposed metric, it is difficult to capture all the dimensions 
underlying the concept of mobility in a single scalar. Indeed, Mob is not able to 
distinguish between migrations to better classifications and migrations to worse 
classifications. Note, for example, that Mob generates the same value for P and P
t. To 
cope with this issue, this study proposes additionally the concepts of improvement and 
worsening mobilities. First, two new transition matrices are generated from the original 
default matrix P, an upper triangular P
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    (8) 
 
Worsening migrations have the same probabilities in P and P
u, but borrowers are not 
allowed to strictly improve in P
u. Analogous note is valid for P
l  and improvement 
migrations. Now a worsening mobility metric and an improvement mobility metric are 




Mob_worsening (P) ≡  Mob(F4(P
u))/ worsening_constant,  (9) 
                                                 
10 To be precise, it is ΔM, not M, that represents a metric (or better yet, a pseudo-metric because it can be null for a pair of distinct 
matrices) in the space of the transition probability matrices. 13 
 
Mob_improvement (P) ≡ Mob(L5(P
l))/ improvement_constant ,  (10) 
where Fm and Lm are matrix operators that replace respectively the first or last m lines of 
a matrix by the corresponding lines of a identity matrix. 
 
Mob_worsening is defined based only on the (worsening) behavior of classifications A, 
AR, B and C, since the behavior of other states, representative of more severe past-due 
ranges, is typically thought of as containing information on recovery. Analogously, 
Mob_improvement is defined based only on the (improvement) behavior of 
classifications D until H. The cut-off between C and D is somewhat arbitrary but based 
on the fact that the discussion about proper default definitions in Brazil lie generally 
between 60 and 90 days. The denominator constants have a normalizing function so that 
the new metrics measure the “average” mobility to a state better (in the case of the 
improvement metric) or worse (in the case of the worsening metric) than the original 
one
11. The new metrics help disentangle the good and bad parts of the concept of 
mobility. 
 
Jafry and Schuermann (2004) further note that Mob is not able to distinguish between 
extreme and short migrations. They show that Mob may fail to generate larger values 
for matrices with migration probability distributed further away from the diagonal and 
suggest that incorporating such desired property may indeed require some ad-hoc 
weighting of the elements of the matrix to be measured. Using that observation as a 
starting point, this study proposes an additional metric based on the concept of expected 
opportunity cost of the operations in arrears. First, an opportunity cost matrix Cost, 9x9, 
is defined as below, where i is the average monthly rate of return of Brazilian consumer 




                                                 




































































For N=9, worseing_constant=1.0763. Analogous definition is valid for the improvement_constant. Its value is 1.0847 for N=9. 
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Cost    (11) 
 
 
The opportunity cost of every transition from A or AR to a classification in arrears is 
approximated by the missed return i compounded the number of months in arrears given 
in table 1.
13 Transitions between classifications in arrears produce all the same cost, 
assuming nothing is paid throughout the semester or that the part paid is insignificant, 
while recovery migrations from classifications in arrears back to A or AR do not 
generate opportunity cost, as if they are paid immediately. These are arbitrary but 
necessary assumptions to come up with a measure of opportunity cost that only assesses 
transition probabilities. The cost metric is then defined as the expected opportunity cost 
of the average portfolio of default classifications. 
 
Cost_metric (P) ≡ weight  • expected cost , (12) 
where expected cost  ≡  (cost × P) • [1, 1, …1]
T ,  (13) 
with the symbol × denoting element wise matrix multiplication and weight the vector 
containing the composition of default classifications found in the data. 
 
Although Cost_metric makes arbitrary assumptions about the exact moments when 
migrations occur and, therefore, is not a precise measure of missed opportunity cost, it 
serves the purposes of penalizing more both default transitions to brackets of higher 
arrears and recovery transitions to brackets of lesser arrears. To reflect average 
Brazilian financial conditions during period 2003-2007, rate i is fixed at 4.5% a.m. and 
                                                 
13 The metric abstracts from exposure considerations. 15 
 
the vector of weights in percentage format estimated from the data is [75.47 4.95 1.02 





Time-homogeneous estimates of 1-semester matrices using the whole 5-year period 
database (to be denoted time-unrestricted estimates) as well as semester-restricted 
estimates are produced for every bank, using the estimation techniques discussed in 
section 3. Representative results are shown and discussed in this section. They include 
comparisons between default criteria, between estimations techniques, between banks 
and over time. 
 
4.1 Default matrices and default classifications 
 
Table 2 shows the time-unrestricted multinomial estimate of bank 1 one-semester 
default matrix. It illustrates the general pattern of default matrices found in this study. 
Compared to matrices of rating agencies (see for example estimates in Lando and 
Skodeberg, 2002), default matrices display much less probability on the diagonal and 
strong probability concentration on the extreme columns A and H. That strong mobility 
of default matrices derives from the fact that most states represent past due ranges, in 
which borrowers are not likely to stay for long (generally not more than one month). In 
table 2 particularly, it is interesting to note that the probability of migration to H 
increases continuously with the departing classification, with a violation of 
monotonicity ocurring only between AR and B. Similarly migration probability to A 
also decreases continuously, with monotonicity violation among departing states AR, B 
and C. Both observations mean that, for bank 1, renegotiated consumer loans are riskier 
than loans less than 30-days past-due. 16 
 




Default matrices are also useful to compare different default definitions. However, the 
classifications of table 1 are not proper default criteria because their specifications 
contain upper bounds for the number of days in arrears. Instead, default criteria can be 
formed by considering the union of worse classifications starting from a given 
classification. For example, the 90-days past-due criterion is recovered from the union 
of states E, F, G and H and will be denoted “>=E” throughout the paper.
14 Similar 
notations are adopted for other default or recovery definitions. Default probabilities 
estimates according to different default criteria are obtained from table 2 by adding up 
the appropriate columns of the matrix. The results in table 3 illustrate the sensitivity of 
PD (derived from departing state A) to different default definitions and may be useful to 
the task of choosing a particular definition to work with in the context of internal credit 
risk models.  
 
Table 3 – Bank 1 default probabilities derived from table 2 
Migration  A→A  A→>=D  A→>=E  A→>=F  A→>=G  A→H 
Probability estimate (%)  87.6 5.8  3.9  2.4  1.1  0.2 
 
 
Based on confidence intervals for migration probabilities, it is possible to check whether 
default classifications are statistically distinguishable. Even in the optimistic case, 
without assumption of time heterogeneity and making use of the 5-year data period, 
                                                 
14 The term default definition or default criterion refer, throughout the paper, to this concept, while the term default classification or 
default severity refer to the classes of table 1.  
AA RBCDEFG H
A 87,6 1,2 2,3 3,2 1,9 1,5 1,3 0,9 0,2
AR 22,4 46,6 0,5 1,4 3,7 3,0 3,2 2,4 16,8
B 34,6 1,3 18,7 11,4 5,7 4,7 4,5 16,0 3,2
C 23,2 3,0 2,8 12,2 6,0 4,5 4,1 6,0 38,3
D 5,6 3,1 1,0 2,6 4,0 2,9 3,4 3,5 74,0
E 1,7 1,5 0,6 1,1 0,6 1,7 1,5 1,3 90,1
F 1,0 1,3 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,7 0,5 94,9
G 0,4 0,7 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,4 97,6
H 0,3 1,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 98,417 
 
figure 2 shows that this is not the case for states G and H at bank 1. Probability 
confidence intervals for both improvement and worsening migrations that depart from G 
and H overlap. For other banks, this phenomenon occurs at pairs (E,F), (G,H) or (F,G), 
implying, in general, the presence of a discrimination problem between classifications 
related to large number of days in arrears. From a statistical standpoint, that means that 
the number of default classifications considered in this study may be excessive. As a 
policy implication, it results that the goal of risk discrimination for loans with 
significant past due (e.g. implicit in requirements of different regulatory provisions) 
may be unfeasible. 
 
Figure 2: Probability confidence intervals for selected default and recovery 
migrations departing from classifications E, F, G, and H at bank 1. Transition 
probabilities estimated by the multinomial method. Confidence intervals are 
analytical based on the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. Y-axes 
are on the log scale. 
 
Confidence interval results based on departure from states AR, B and C illustrates 
another interesting issue at Figure 3. By considering less stringent default or recovery 
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definitions (e.g. moving from H to >=D or from <=A to <=AR), it is possible to recover 
probability monotonicity (with no interval overlap) across classifications. The non-
monotone behaviour at the extreme migrations (shown already in table 2) disappears 
once new classifications are added to the target definition, in great part due to a sample 
size increase effect. 
 
Figure 3: Probability confidence intervals for selected default and recovery 
migrations departing from classifications AR, B and C at bank 1. Transition 
probabilities estimated by the multinomial method. Confidence intervals are 
analytical based on the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. Y-axes 
are on the log scale. 
 
 
Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, attention will be restricted to transitions to default 
























































Migration to >= H19 
 
4.2 Comparison between estimation techniques 
 
I now focus on the comparison between estimation techniques. The bank 1 one-semester 
default matrix is also estimated by the homogeneous survival method (again using the 
whole 5-year period) and table 4 shows the probability ratios between the duration and 
the multinomial estimates for some selected migrations of interest. Compared to the 
multinomial estimation, the survival estimation implies higher probabilities of transition 
from non-arrears classifications (A and AR) to typical default definitions such as >=D, 
>=E and H, but also higher probabilities for typical recovery migrations, such as from D 
until H back to A or <=AR (typical migrations in blue). Those findings are qualitatively 
consistent with what is found for default transitions of top quality ratings of external 
agencies (e.g. Hanson and Schuermann, 2006) and with the discussion of section 3 
regarding the efficiency gains of survival estimation for rare transitions. Nevertheless, it 
is impressive the sizable difference in estimates for the extreme migrations: for 
A→>=H, the duration estimate is 10 times the multinomial estimate, going from 0.2% 
to 2.2%. 
 
Table 4: Probability ratios between the homogeneous duration and the 
multinomial estimates for selected migrations at bank 1. 
 
 
It is also interesting to note that the survival estimator gives lower probabilities for 
transitions between classifications in arrears (the right low corner of table 4). A possible 
explanation could be the presence of downward momentum, a violation of the Markov 
property in which borrowers who have been downgraded have a higher chance of a 
further downgrade. Since the survival estimator makes more use of the Markov property 
than its multinomial counterpart, it is generally less affected by the presence of 
A <=AR >=D >=E H
A 0,96 0,97 1,40 1,53 10,31
AR 1,30 0,74 1,59 1,72 1,93
B 1,69 1,70 0,88 0,90 3,85
C 1,53 1,50 0,95 0,99 0,86
D 2,30 1,95 0,93 0,95 0,85
E 3,43 2,78 0,95 0,95 0,91
F 3,24 2,47 0,97 0,97 0,95
G 5,16 3,89 0,97 0,97 0,96
H 5,76 2,67 0,98 0,98 0,9720 
 
downward momentum. See similar discussion in Hanson and Schuermann (2006) for 
the case of rating agencies. If downward momentum is the cause (and it could be clearly 
intuitive when classifications are based on past-due ranges), its effect is relatively small: 
the survival estimates are as close as 95% of the multinomial ones for the transitions 
considered. Therefore, the issue is no further investigated in this paper. All observations 
related to table 4 are qualitatively similar to all the banks analyzed. 
 
Similarly to table 4, table 5 displays a comparison between the non-homogeneous and 
homogeneous estimators of the 1-semester default matrix of bank 1, the former relative 
to the first semester of 2007.  The ratios here are generally closer to 1 than in table 4, 
particularly for the typical default and recovery transitions, in blue. For those migrations 
it is valid, as in Jafry and Schuerman (2004), that the efficient gains of survival 
estimation are more important than a hypothesis of homonegeneity (and this holds for 
other banks and semesters as well). On the other hand, for all migrations in general, the 
differences between the two survival estimators are far greater than in the case of rating 
agencies (see, Lando and Skodeberg, 2002, for the latter). That suggests that time 
specific shocks, for example related to discrete movements in the credit policy of the 
bank, have a material impact on the results and demonstrate that the Aalen-Johansen 
estimator may be a useful tool for closely monitoring the behavior of delinquencies on a 
bank level. Indeed, specific ratios contained in table 5 may vary significantly 
dependending on the bank and the semester considered, the larger time variations 
between semesters generally found for extreme migrations (e.g. A→H and H→A) and 
for migrations involving the AR renegotiated state. 
 
Table 5: Probability ratios between the non-homogeneous and the homogeneous 
estimates for selected migrations at bank 1. 
A <=AR >=D >=E H
A 1,00 1,00 1,01 1,03 0,65
AR 1,17 1,03 0,95 0,94 0,94
B 1,04 1,05 1,02 1,11 0,98
C 0,98 0,99 1,04 1,09 1,38
D 0,92 0,95 1,02 1,03 1,25
E 0,83 0,95 1,01 1,01 1,10
F 0,97 1,07 1,00 0,99 1,02
G 0,75 0,94 1,01 1,01 1,01
H 0,84 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,0021 
 
The variations over time between the different estimation techniques for bank 1 are 
analyzed in figure 4. For that, the metrics discussed in section 3 are helpful in avoiding 
the ungrateful task of understanding the behaviour of 81 matrix elements over time. For 
all metrics but the worsening mobility, figure 4 reafirms the previously mentioned result 
that the difference between the survival and the discrete estimation (in this case cohort) 
are larger than those found between the two types of survival estimation, regardless of 
the bank analyzed (the latter not shown). For some metrics, the homogeneity 
assumption is almost irrelevant (e.g. metrics cost and improvement mobility for bank 1). 
On the other hand, the decision to adopt or not an homogeneity assumption is important 
to the worsening mobility for most banks (clearly important for bank 1 at figure 4). 
Results not shown indicate that this is in large part due to the inclusion of non-typical 
default migrations departing from B and C in the worsening metric (and therefore do not 
stay in contrast with the previous observations about typical transitions). Hereafter, for 
the sake of brevity, only the homogeneous case of the survival estimation is reported. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison between default matrix estimation techniques over time via 

































Homogeneous survival Cohort Non-homog. survival22 
 
Besides the estimation techniques, figure 4 allows an analysis of the metrics themselves. 
Note that the mobility metric for 1-semester default matrices vary at ranges much higher 
than the typical mobility values achieved by 1-year rating agencies’ matrices (e.g. 
≈[0.12 0.24] as found by Jafry and Schuerman, 2004)
15. That is just another result 
pointing to the greater mobility of default matrices, already observed in table 1. 
However, a great part of that mobility of default matrices is on the worsening direction, 
given the values assumed by the worsening and improvement mobility metrics. Only the 
improvement mobility of 1-semester default matrices is already of comparable order to 
the whole mobility of 1-year rating agencies’ matrices.
16 
 
4.3 Time-paths of transition probilities  
 
The most immediate evidence of figure 4 was left uncommented so far: that default 
matrices are far from constant over time.  In this subsection time heterogeneity along 
semesters is properly investigated at the transition level, which permits the 
incorporation of  analytical confidence intervals to the analysis. Figure 5 shows for bank 
1 the time paths of selected migration probabilities, estimated by cohort, together with 
their confidence intervals. The blue horizontal line is the multinomial estimator 
(equivalent to the weighted average of cohort estimators by the number of borrowers at 
each semester start) while the green line represents the simple average of cohorts, 
motivated by Gagliardini and Gouriéroux (2005). 
Results indicate pronounced time variation of transition probabilities. The confidence 
intervals do not include the horizontal lines for most of the 5-year period for transitions 
A→ >=D and A→>=E and the paths of these transtions are clearly not derived from just 
white noise (the assumption underlying the simple average estimator). It means that 
default matrices for bank 1 are neither constant nor i.i.d.. On the other hand, not much 
can be concluded about time variation for migration A→H and the recovery migrations 
from the use of analytical intervals
17. At the same time, note that, for all transitions, the 
range of time variation is much greater than the difference between the simple and 
weithed average estimators, implying that the choice of the particular  homogeneous 
                                                 
151-year default matrices will have even higher mobility. 
16 Given the simplifications underlying the cost metric, this paper refrains from interpreting its absolute values and will prefer to 
investigage cost distances instead, on section 4.4. 
17 Here bootstrap intervals (e.g. Hanson and Schuermann, 2006) could be of some utility. They are, however, too computational 
intensive for the large dataset of this study and, therefore, out of the scope of this paper. 23 
 
estimator becomes less relevant in the Brazilian data.  Finally, note that probability 
intervals degenerate at some semesters for improvement migrations E→A and H→A. 
That represents a deficiency of analytical intervals when the probability estimate is zero 
and harms the analysis of those semesters
18. 
 
Figure 5: Time paths of selected migration probabilities (in red), estimated by 
cohort, together with their confidence intervals (in pink and light blue). Results for 
bank 1. The blue horizontal line is the multinomial estimator (equivalent to the 
weighted average of cohort estimators by the number of borrowers at each 
semester start) while the green line represents the simple average of cohort 
estimators. 
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Figure 6 shows analogous results for bank 2.  The important distinction lies on the fact 
that bank 2 shows a sharp decrease in default rates over time (according to the 
transitions A→>=D and A→>=E) whereas bank 1 shows an increase pattern until the 
end of 2005. The comparison between banks including the time dimension is further 
addressed at subsection 4.5.  
 
Figure 6: Time paths of selected migration probabilities (in red), estimated by 
cohort, together with their confidence intervals (in pink and light blue). Results for 
bank 2. The blue horizontal line is the multinomial estimator (equivalent to the 
weighted average of cohort estimators by the number of borrowers at each 






















A  to  >=H
 
 





















H  to  <=A
 
 
Weighted average Simple average Semester probability25 
 
4.4 Static comparison between banks 
 
Supervisory authorities are often interested in making comparisons between banks in 
terms of credit risk ranges in which they operate. For analytical purposes, sometimes 
banks are grouped together based on similar credit risk characteristics or other attributes 
and monitored jointly over time, in search for the outbreak of any within-group bank 
discrepancy at some point in time. In the context of this paper, grouping of banks based 
on similar (or distinct) credit risk profiles can be obtained from the analysis of either 
selected migrations or matrix metrics. 
 
I start the analysis on the transition level.
19 Regarding default transitions, figure 7 shows 
that, among the four banks analyzed, bank 4 presents the highest default probabilities 
from state A and among the two highest from AR, whereas bank 3 displays always the 
lowest default rates. These banks are likely to operate in different ranges of credit risk 
and price accordingly. On the other hand, banks 1 and 2 generally lie in-between and 
seem more similar in default behavior when renegotiated loans are not considered. As 
far as recovery transitions are concerned, the general picture is more entangled, possibly 
reflecting smaller differences in recovery efficacies or policies. Banks 1, 2 and 3 
experience close rates, at least starting from classifications D and E, while bank 4 
generally presents the lowest improvement probability.  As a net result from both 
default and recovery aspects, it may be appropriate to identify banks 1 and 2 as 
constituting a pair of banks with more similar risk behaviors and banks 3 and 4 as a pair 
with notably distinct risk profiles. Indeed, tests on equality of means find 54 different 
transition probabilities for the first pair of banks and 68 differences for the second.  
 
                                                 
19All the results of this subsection are based on time-unrestricted homogeneous duration estimates. 26 
 
Figure 7:  Comparison between banks’ selected migration probabilities. On the 
right, default migrations and on the left recovery migrations. Probabilities 
estimated by time-unrestricted homogeneous duration. 
 
 
Here again, default matrices’ metrics are useful in consolidating the results of many 
transitions, this time to provide a meaningful cross-bank comparison. In table 6, metrics 
make it easier to explore how each pair of banks compare to each other. Table 6 also 
explains similarity or distinction between banks’ credit risks based on the concepts of 
mobility, worsening mobility, improvement mobility and opportunity cost. Banks 1 and 
2 are the closest pair of banks for every metric but improvement (but also near to the 
closest according to improvement) while banks 3 and 4 are the most dissimilar in every 
aspect. Note, in particular, that both the respective similarity and dissimilarity of pairs 
(1,2) and (3,4) in terms of mobility can be largely attributed to worsening mobility, in 
which they display values far from the rest of the banks’ pairs. Finally, the cost metric 
shows that differences between default matrices are of economic significance. 
Assuming an average bank difference in rates charged for consumer credit of 1% a.m. 
within the universe of large Brazilian banks, table 6 reveals that as high as a quarter of 
that could be derived from bank differences in default opportunity costs
20. All in all, 
table 6 is a powerful tool for immediate cross-bank comparison. 
 
                                                 
20 It is possible that bank differences in opportunity costs are subestimated, since the same return rate i is applied to every bank in 
the cost metric. It is reasonable to expect that banks that normally operate with riskier default matrices will also charge higher and 
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Table 6: Metric distances between banks’ default matrices. Matrices are estimated 
by homogeneous duration. 
 
 
4.5 Dynamic comparison between banks 
 
I now investigate what new information can be derived from the inclusion of the time 
dimension in the cross-bank comparison. I start the analysis on the transition level, 
focusing on the representative default transition A→>=E (estimated by the 
homogeneous survival method), and then turn to metrics for a more complete 
delinquency description.  Figure 8 shows, for the selected migration and for all banks, a 
large time heterogeneity along the semesters, reaffirming therefore the general evidence 
of figures 5 and 6 and generalizing them to banks 3 and 4. More striking, however, are 
the sharp differences in the probability trajectories among the four banks. In particular, 
note that banks 1 and 2, when observed along time, no longer seem so similar as before. 
The high dissimilarity between banks’ trajectories can be attributed to differences in 
market niches, growth strategies, renegotiation policies, among others. Bank analysts in 
possession of specific bank information can use the results of figure 8 to link their 
knowledge of banks’ policies and decisions to the resulting time variations of credit 
delinquencies. The explanation of such variations is not within the scope of this paper. 
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3  Bank 4
Bank 1 -            -            -            -           
Mobility Bank 2 0,01          -            -            -           
Bank 3 0,04          0,05          -            -           
Bank 4 0,02          0,01          0,06          -           
Bank 1 -            -            -            -           
Improvement Bank 2 0,03          -            -            -           
mobility Bank 3 0,03          0,06          -            -           
Bank 4 0,06          0,02          0,08          -           
Bank 1 -            -            -            -           
Worsening Bank 2 0,01          -            -            -           
mobility Bank 3 0,07          0,08          -            -           
Bank 4 0,12          0,11          0,18          -           
Bank 1 -            -            -            -           
Cost Bank 2 0,03          -            -            -           
metric Bank 3 0,11          0,14          -            -           
Bank 4 0,15          0,12          0,26          -           28 
 
Figure 8: Trajectories of banks’ probabilities of default transition A→>=E. 
Probabilities estimated by semester-restricted homogeneous duration. The blue 
horizontal line is the time-unrestricted homogeneous survival estimator (kind of a 
weighted average) while the green line is the simple average of the semester-
restricted survival estimators. 
 
 
Figure 8 still reveals that, apart from the aforementioned differences, there seems to be, 
from 2006 until the end of 2007, a decreasing move in default rates common to all 
banks.  It could reflect a new phase in the risk dynamics of the Brazilian consumer 
credit market. That would be consistent with the general descending trend of the 
average Brazilian consumer credit spread observed during the same period, as depicted 
in Figure 9. However, a closer investigation of the relationship between spread and 
default risk (measured on a flow approach) would require longer time series of default 






























Weighted average Simple average Migration A to >=E29 
 
Figure 9: Trajectory of average spread charged on non-payroll-deducted Brazilian 
consumer credit with non-earmarked funds and preset rates. 
 
 
In order to incorporate other transitions to the comparative analysis of banks’ time 
evolution, matrix metrics results are now investigated. Figure 10 shows the distances 
along time between semester-restricted default matrices and time unrestricted matrices 
(all estimated by homogeneous survival), for each bank and each metric. Distances are 
used to allow the analysis to better focus on the relative movements of banks’ metric 
trajectories, apart from the average levels in which banks operate. The trajectories 
confirm the high dissimilarity among banks’ credit risk dynamics. During the passage 
from the first to the second half of the time period analyzed, bank 1 is experiencing a 
decrease in worsening mobility and an increase in improvement mobility, moving then 
to a less risky net position, while bank 2 displays an opposite behavior.  At the same 
time, bank 3 shows a large decrease in improvement mobility and a moderate 
stabilization after a sharp reduction in worsening mobility. Bank 4 displays relatively 
stable metric trajectories, apart from sharp movements in the worsening and 
improvement mobilities in the first half of the period.
21 Finally, note that the variation of 
the whole mobility is shorter than of other mobilities, since it averages out the effects of 
many mobility directions that possibly behave in different ways.  
 
                                                 
21 Perhaps these sharp movements are caused by a data problem. The study was not able to determine the specific cause. 





































Figure 10: Trajectories of banks’ distances between semester-restricted default 




The worsening metric trajectories display important distinctions with regard to the paths 
of migration A→>=E depicted in figure 8. For bank 1, the peak in default occurs sooner 
according to the metric than according to the referred transition, so that the worsening 
metric works in this case as a warning indicator to the default definition >=E. That 
shows that other default transitions (to less severe default definitions than >=E or 
starting from already more severe states than A) add information to the general default 
behavior of bank 1. For bank 2, the worsening metric serves to smooth the ascending 
part of the default transition path A→>=E in the first half of the period and, then, to 
drastically reverse the decreasing pattern of the transition in the second half. That shows 
again the new information provided by metrics of default matrices. Banks 3 and 4 seem 
to face smaller differences between the metric paths and the transition paths.  
 
I now reinsert the average levels into the bank comparative analysis. Figure 11 displays, 
for each metric, the absolute trajectories of all banks together. Here, it is possible to 
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lie between the extremes represented by banks 3 and 4. (The general picture is again a 
little more entangled on the improvement dimension) There is notably, however, an 
inversion in relative positions, from the first to the second halves of the period, of both 
worsening and improvement mobilities of banks 1 and 2. Bank 2 surpasses bank 1 in 
credit risk at the second half, with higher worsening and smaller improvement. Note 
that this also translates into the opening of an opportunity cost gap between two banks 
at the second half. That is the sort of within-group bank comparative analysis that can 
be useful to prompt closer investigations of specific banks. 
 
Figure 11: Trajectories of banks’ metrics of semester-restricted default matrices. 
All matrices are estimated by homogeneous survival. 
 
 
In figure 11, it is possible to observe that both the cost and the mobility metrics 
resemble slightly the general pattern of the worsening mobility (at least in terms of 
banks’ relative positions). That is not surprising since the cost metric weights much 
more departing classifications in no arrears, from which improvement is not a 
possibility, and since a great part of the mobility of default matrices, composed of many 



































This paper investigates the measurement of credit delinquency through a flow approach 
instead of the easier and more popular stock methodology.  A flow approach does not 
let measurement of credit risk to be distorted by non-default events, such as the increase 
in the number of loans, as observed in Brazil in recent years. In order to avoid missing 
relevant information, this paper further proposes considering many default severities 
together, related to several past-due ranges, and the transition rates between them. The 
suggested approach becomes then a multivariate flow description of default risk (as well 
as of recovery risk), called default matrix, and metrics are proposed to compare 
different matrices. Besides the mobility metric suggested in the literature, this paper 
proposes an improvement and a worsening mobility metrics, in order to disentangle the 
good and bad parts of mobility, as well as a cost metric that penalizes more some 
transitions to more severe default classifications. 
 
One-semester default matrices are estimated for consumer credit at four large Brazilian 
banks. Default matrices present very high mobility, more located on the worsening 
direction. Only their improvement mobility is already of similar order to the whole 
mobility of 1-year rating agencies’ matrices. Default matrices are also shown useful to 
explore or compare different default severities, focusing on aspects such as probability 
monotonicity and risk discrimination. In particular, this paper points out problematic 
risk discrimination between default classifications related to large number of days in 
arrears. 
 
As far as estimating techniques are concerned, this paper indicates the efficiency gains 
of survival compared to discrete estimation, reflected in the larger survival estimated 
probabilities for typical default and recovery migrations. The effect of the homogeneity 
assumption is shown, in general, less important than the difference between survival and 
discrete estimation, but, contrary to the case of rating agencies, it is far from 
insignificant and, for some banks, quite pronounced through the lens of the worsening 
mobility metric. The non-homogeneous survival estimator could be, therefore, a useful 
tool for closely monitoring within-semester time specific shocks on a bank level. 
 33 
 
As far as time evolution of default risk is concerned, empirical results of this study show 
that the sharp increase in Brazilian consumer credit during the period from 2003 until 
2007 was followed by strong heterogeneity of credit risk over time and across banks. 
That heterogeneity is observed not only in some default classification transitions but 
also through the consolidated credit risk behavior reflected in default matrices’ metrics. 
That indicates that time and bank variations in growth strategies, in renegotiation 
policies, among other credit policies, have also been high in recent years. On the other 
hand, from 2006 until the end of 2007, a common decreasing move across banks is 
noted in transition from the no-arrears, non-renegotiated state to the 90-days past-due 
default definition, although that trend is not identified from the trajectories of the bank 
worsening metrics. In fact, default matrices metrics can display important distinctions in 
their trajectories with regard to particular migration paths. The paper finds examples 
where the worsening metric works as an early warning indicator to a particular default 
definition or radically reverses the behavior of a migration path.  
 
Metrics also provide credit risk distances between banks in a straightforward manner 
that can be useful to supervisory purposes. Among the four banks analyzed, metrics 
identify the most similar and the most dissimilar pairs of banks. The respective 
similarity and dissimilarity of the two pairs are more pronounced according to 
worsening rather than to improvement mobility. Also, these characteristics are valid not 
only on a static comparison but also over time. Nevertheless, the banks forming the 
similar pair inverse their relative metric positions from the first to the second halves of 
the period analyzed, a fact more clearly noted through the use of metrics again. 
 
Two final notes about applications of this work are worth mentioning. First, it should be 
remarked that the sort of results produced, coupled with other sources of bank risk 
information available to the supervisory authority, such as on-site supervision, should 
allow it to better understand the behavior of realized default over time on a bank level 
and prompt closer investigations when necessary. Second, longer time series of 
Brazilian default matrices could assist in drawing relationships between multivariate 
flow measured default risk and credit spreads, business cycle indicators and/or 
macroeconomic variables, shedding new light on past studies that usually employ 
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